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1. Types of debt crises
Debt crises have occurred in the South-East Asian, Latin American and African
countries. Economies have borrowed either to finance government deficits, or
investment/ capital formation as in South-East Asia. The debt, denominated in either
domestic or foreign currency, may either be short-term that must be repaid with interest
at maturity, or it may be long-term which just has to be serviced regularly. There are
several sources of uncertainty, which may be positively or negatively correlated: the real
return on capital and the variable real interest rate. Since it is not possible to predict either
the return on capital or the interest rate, default has occurred frequently.
The issues discussed in this paper are as follows. (a) How much of a debt is too
much? What is an optimal or a sustainable external debt - for a country, region or sector?
(b) How should one monitor and evaluate debt to preclude a crisis? (c) We use stochastic
optimal control/dynamic programming to derive an optimal debt. The deviation of the
actual from the optimal will serve as a Warning Signal of a crisis. (d) There is a
correspondence between Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation of Dynamic Programming
and the static Mean-Variance (M-V) analysis in finance. A graphic analysis of M-V is
helpful to explain the implications of DP. This paper is an application of Fleming-Stein
(2004), Fleming-Pang (2003), and is a generalization of the Merton model. The analysis
in Fleming-Stein (2001) has been applied by Stein-Paladino (2001) to crises involving
short-term debt.
An explicit example used in this paper is the US Agricultural debt crisis, because
the empirical data correspond closely to the appropriate mathematical variables. Figure 1
plots three variables concerning the US agricultural sector: the ratio of interest
payments/value added, equity = capital less debt, and the delinquency rate on loans to
commercial banks. During the prosperous years 1972-80 land values rose and, using the
capital gains as collateral, farmers incurred debt to buy more land which produced more
capital gains. The boom generated by capital gains was unsustainable. From 1980-86,J.L. Stein 3
farm equity fell by by three standard deviations with a rise in bankruptcies and defaults
on loans. The shaded area refers to the debt crisis. Using available information, what
warning signals should have alerted the farm and banking sectors to the impending crisis?
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  Figure 1. US Agriculture 1960 - 2002. INTVA = total interest payments/value added.
EQUITY = assets  - debt . DELINQRATECOM = delinquent farm loans to commercial
banks, percentage of outstanding loans. Normalized variables: (variable - mean)/standard
deviation.
2. A Prototype model
The model underlying the optimization is summarized in the equations in BOX 1.
The variables are real, measured in terms of goods produced. This benchmark model is
sufficiently general to be applicable to almost any economy. The crucial features are that
the fundamentals - the real return on capital and the variable real interest rate - areJ.L. Stein 4
described by equations of Brownian motion. There is an expected return on capital but
the actual return does not revert to a constant mean; and a similar situation exists for the
real rate of interest. It is not possible to predict either the value of the return on capital or
the interest rate. These equations are used to derive benchmarks of Rational Expectations
(RE) optimal performance, conditional upon the real fundamentals: the real return on
capital and the interest rate.
The actual debt deviates from the RE optimal because market participants base
decisions upon anticipated capital gains that are not based upon these fundamentals. The
unsustainable capital gains resulting from these anticipations generate speculative
bubbles, like the dot.com in the US and the real estate boom in South-East Asia. The
deviation between the actual and the optimal debt is a bubble that bursts when subjected
to shocks. In part 5 below, we explain the farm debt crisis and provide warning signals.
The performance criterion to be maximized is the expected present value of the
utility of consumption, equation (1). The maximum value is V(X), where X is the initial
net worth. The utility function selected is HARA, equation (1a) where risk aversion is
(1-γ) > 0, γ ≠ 0. The HARA utility function has two great advantages. First, it implies that
we may focus upon ratios, such as consumption/net worth c = C/X, debt/net worth f =
L/X and capital/net worth k = K/X. Second: the HARA assumption lowers the dimension
of the dynamical system, and the model can be solved analytically. Otherwise, the DP
model must solved using numerical values and a computer. When γ = 0, risk aversion is
(1-γ) = 1, and the utility function is (1b) the logarithmic function. An infinite time
horizon is selected with an arbitrary discount rate of δ > 0. The effective length of the
horizon is inversely related to the discount rate. A high discount rate implies a short
horizon. If γ < 0, there is no mathematical need to have a discount rate.J.L. Stein 5
                               BOX 1.
EQUATIONS OF THE STOCHASTIC GROWTH MODEL
(1)V(X) =  max c,f Ew {
0
∞
∫ U(C(t)) e 
-δt dt }
(1a) U(C) = (1/γ)C
γ
t, γ < 1, γ ≠ 0; (1b) U(t) = ln Ct,  γ = 0,   C = consumption
(2a) dLt= rtLtdt + (Ct + It - Yt)dt        L = debt,  f = L/X
(2b) Ctdt = Ytdt - rtLtdt - Itdt + dLt > 0                     c = C/X
(3) Kt = PtNt                                                             K = capital,  Y = value added
(4) Yt dt / PtNt = bt dt = b dt + σb dwb ,  dwb = εb√dt,  εb  ~N(0, 1) iid
(5) rtLtdt = rLtdt + σrLtdwr; dwr = εr √dt,  εr  ~N(0, 1) iid interest payments
(5a) Lt < hR0e
ηt lending  constraint
(6) E(εb εr) = ρ, 1 > ρ > −1.
(7)  dPt/Pt = µ dt + σpdwp.  P = relative price of "land" N
(7a) E(dwp, dwb)) = 0, E(dwp, dwr) = 0
(8) Xt = Kt - Lt= PtNt - Lt         net worth = equity
Equations (2a) and (2b) are the same. In (2a), the change in the debt dLt is the
sum of the debt service rtLt at interest rate rt, plus consumption Ct plus investment I t less
income Yt, over a period of length dt. Equation (2b) puts consumption on the left hand
side. It is income less debt service less investment over the period plus new borrowing.
For an economy, the sum of value added is GDP or income, denoted Yt.
The production function is equations (3)-(4). Equation (3) states that capital Kt is
the product of a physical quantity Nt, "land", times the Pt relative price of land/price of
output. Equation (4) states that the productivity of capital, ratio bt dt = Yt dt /Kt of gross
value added to capital, is described by a stochastic process. The productivity of capital is
the sum of a deterministic term b dt plus a stochastic term σb dwb. Call b the mean return
on investment. The stochastic part of the growth of value added term σb dwb results from
changes in prices of output relative to the purchased inputs of materials, physical
productivity such as output/acre, and variations in demand.J.L. Stein 6
Equation (5) describes the stochastic servicing of the debt rtLt over the short
period dt. The real rate of interest over the short period rt dt is the sum of a deterministic
term - the mean r dt - plus a stochastic term, which has a variance σr
2 dt over the period.
The stochastic part results from variations in monetary policy, the business cycle or,
when an external debt in denominated in foreign currency, from changes in the exchange
rate. The demand for loans by the entire agricultural sector is Lt. Constraint (5a) states
that Lt cannot exceed the loans that the banking system is willing to supply. The latter is a
multiple h > 0 of the reserves R0e
ηt which grow at exogenous rate η. This constraint is
important in explaining in section (5.2) below why bubbles burst and debt crises occur.
Each disturbance, to either the return on investment or to the real rate of interest,
is time independent. Equation (6) states that the two disturbances, to the growth rate and
to the interest rate, may be correlated, either positively or negatively. This correlation
occurs by matching up one variation in dwb with one in dwr.
Figure 2 graphs the two basic stochastic variables in the farm sector. The
measured return per annum on real farm assets bt = real gross value added/real farm
assets is denoted GVACAP; and the interest rate per annum rt = interest expense/farm
debt is denoted INTDEB. Neither variable reverts to a constant mean. The correlation
between them switches between positive and negative.
Net worth or equity Xt, equation (8) is defined as capital Kt, from (3), less debt Lt.
We constrain the optimization to the case where net worth X(t) > 0. This constraint
excludes "Ponzi schemes", where the economy borrows to service the debt ad infinitum.J.L. Stein 7
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Figure 2. U.S. Farm sector. Return = bt = gross value added/value farm assets =
GVACAP. Interest rate =  rt = interest expenses/debt = INTDEBT
The change in the value of assets dKt = d(PtKt) is equation (9). The first term
PtdNt =  It dt is investment at market prices, and the second term (NtPt)(dPt/Pt) is the
capital gain (or loss) resulting from the rise (fall) in the price of the physical asset - Nt
called "land" - relative to the price of output.
(9) dKt = PtdNt + (NtPt)(dPt/Pt) = It dt + Kt(dPt/Pt)
In many debt crises - such as US agriculture, South-East Asia, or the dot.com
stocks - there is a "bubble", defined as the case where the capital gains equation (7) are
independent of the movements of the fundamentals bt and rt.J.L. Stein 8
The market assumes that there is an upward trend µ > 0 in the relative price of "land",
plus a Brownian motion term σpdwp . Both the Brownian motion (BM) term σpdwp  and
the trend term µ are independent of the other two BM terms in BOX 1, as described by
equation (7a). In the case where there are "rational expectations" (RE), the market price
of the asset will be closely linked to the fundamentals bt and rt and µ = 0. Our standard of
optimal performance is the rational expectations case.
We have assumed that the return bt = Yt dt /PtNt = Yt dt /Kt = real gross value
added/real value of assets is described by stochastic process equation (4), which is
graphed as return GVACAP in figure 2. This formulation was selected because data are
available for Y and K = PN, and Y/K can be described by Brownian motion. On the other
hand, Fleming and Pang (2003) assume that the return real gross value added/acre = Yt dt
/Nt  is described by a stochastic process. In the RE case, both forms are identical, but the
results differ in the case where µ > 0.
We show below that the optimization based upon µ > 0 leads to an unsustainable
situation - a debt crisis. The deviation between the debt/net worth held in case where µ >
0 and the debt/net worth held in the case of rational expectations case µ = 0 provides us
with Warning Signals of a debt crisis.
3. Dynamic Programming Solution
In this section we derive the dynamic programming solution for the optimal debt.
Then it is shown how the inter-temporal dynamic programming DP solution can be given
a mean-variance M-V interpretation. We then compare the optimal market debt when µ >
0 with the rational expectations RE solution when µ = 0.
The state variable is net worth X(t) defined in equation (8). It is capital Kt less Lt
debt. The change in net worth is equation (10).
(10) dXt = dKt - dLt
Derive equation (11) by using (9) for dKt and (2a) for dLt. The HARA function implies
that consumption is proportional to net worth Ct = cXt and the debt is also proportional to
net worth Lt = fXt, (Fleming-Stein, 2004). The ratio f = L/X is debt/net worth. From (8),J.L. Stein 9
capital/net worth kt = Kt/Xt = 1 + ft > 0. Equation (11) is the stochastic differential
equation. The first set of terms in brackets is deterministic and the second is stochastic.
(11) dXt/ Xt = [(b-c) + (b-r)f + (1+f)µ] dt + [(1+f)σbdwb - fσrdwr + (1+f)σp dwp ]
There are two controls, u = (f,c). One control is c = Ct/Xt > 0 the consumption
ratio. The second control is the debt ratio f = Lt/Xt > -1. A negative debt is net financial
assets. It is assumed that the debt can be varied instantly and with no cost. This
assumption is too strong and will be relaxed in subsequent research. The optimization (1)
is subject to the dynamic equation (11) and to the constraints Ct > 0, Xt > 0.
Given the nature of the uncertainty, the controller cannot anticipate the future.
The admissible controls are chosen using any information known up to time t. We
therefore consider the controls that enter as feedback functions of the state Xt. The
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman dynamic programming equations (12a) and (12b) are based
upon the dynamics of the change in net worth, equation (11). See Fleming-Soner (1992).
(12a) δV(X) = maxu [G
uV(X) + (1/γ)(cX)
γ], u = (f, c > 0).
(12b) G
uV(X) = [(b-c) + (b-r)f  + (1+f)µ ]XVx
+ (1/2)[f
2σr
2 - 2f(1+f) ρσrσb+ (1+f)
2 (σb
2 + σp
2)]X
2Vxx
With the HARA utility function, we may write the value function as equation (13)
where the constant A > 0 is to be determined from (12) and (13).
(13) V(X) = (A/γ)X
γ
Using equation (13) and its derivatives in (12) we derive the DP equation (14)
where V*(f,c) is defined in (14a,b,c).
(14) δ/γ = max c,f {(1/γ)c
γ  /Α + V*(f,c) }= max c,f {(1/γ)c
γ /A+ M(f,c) - (1- γ)R(f)}
(14a) V*(f,c) = [M(f,c) - (1- γ)R(f)]
(14b) M(f,c) = [(b-c) + (b-r)f  + (1+f)µ ]
(14c) R(f) = (1/2)[f
2σr
2 - 2f(1+f) ρσrσb+ (1+f)
2(σb
2 + σp
2)]
The optimal debt/equity f is independent of the optimal consumption ratio. Define
the market optimal debt/net worth ratio fs as one where µ > 0, when there are speculative
capital gains, and define the Rational Expectations optimal f* as the special case where µ
= 0. The optimal ratio is stated in equation (15), where σ
2 and f(0) are defined in
equations (15a), (15b) respectively. The ratio θ = σr/σb = standard deviations of theJ.L. Stein 10
interest rate/ rate of return and ratio ω = σp/σb = standard deviations of the capital gain /
rate of return. The market optimal debt/net worth ratio fs is a linear function of the
expected net rate of return including the trend capital gain (b + µ -r). The expected real
rate of return is b, and the expected real rate of interest is (r - µ), where µ is the expected
capital gain. As shown in section (5.2) below, the expected capital gain µ > 0 is
unsustainable. The Rational expectations case sets µ = 0 and the optimal debt/net worth
f* is equation (15-RE). The slope is the reciprocal of risk aversion (1-γ) times risk σ
2 =
variance (b - r + dp/p) in equation (15a). The market debt/equity ratio fs will exceed the
RE value f* if the expected trend inflation of asset prices µ > 0. Equation (15c) relates to
constraint (5a). The demand for loans in the RE case f*X*t, where X*t is the net worth in
the RE case, does not exceed the loans that banks are willing to make.
Optimal debt/net worth fs, Rational Expectations Case f*
(15) fs ∈argmax [M(f,c) - (1- γ)R(f)]  = (b + µ -r)/(1-γ)σ
2 - f(0)
(15-RE) f* = (b -r)/(1-γ)σ
2 - f(0)
(15a) σ
2 = var (b - r + dp/p) = (σb
2 + σr
2 + σp
2 - 2ρσbσr) = σb
2 (1 + θ
2 + ω
2 - 2ρθ)
(15b) f(0) = (1 + ω
2 − ρθ) / (1 + θ
2 + ω
2 - 2ρθ)
(15c) f*X*t < h R0e
ηt
Equation (15) is a generalization of Merton's equation for the optimal ratio of
risky assets/net worth. In Merton's model, the rate of interest is deterministic so θ = 0.
There is only one component of the return on the risky asset, either bt or dpt/pt. Let it be bt
so that ω = 0. (We could have chosen dpt/pt and ignored bt). Then, equation (15) for the
optimal risky assets/net worth k = 1 + f is equation (16). This is exactly Merton's
equation.
(16) k* = 1 + f* = (b - r)/(1-γ)σb
2
The meaning of the intercept term f(0) is discussed in the Mean-Variance section below.
4. A "mean-variance" (M-V) interpretation
The Tobin-Markowitz mean variance (M-V) analysis is the cornerstone of much
of the work in the field of investment/portfolio allocation analysis. It is extensively used
in the agricultural finance literature to evaluate risk for agricultural firms. The M-VJ.L. Stein 11
analysis is based upon a static two period model of portfolio choice between "safe" and
"risky" assets, whose great virtue is that it yields clear and operational results. Our model
in BOX 1 seems to be quite different. Growth is endogenous over an infinite horizon and
there is risk on both the debt and on capital.
We show how the inter-temporal dynamic programming equations (14- 15) can
be given an interpretation in the traditional static two-period "mean-variance" portfolio
choice model. The DP equation (14) can be expressed in several ways. The first term
[(1/γ)c
γ  /Α] is the utility of present consumption, where term A > 0 is to be determined
from the solution. The second term V*(f,c) can be interpreted in equation (14a) as
Expected M-V utility. It is equal to the Mean, equation (14b), less the product of risk
aversion (1-γ) > 0 and Risk, equation (14c). The Mean is the expected percentage change
in net worth E(dXt/dt)/Xt in equation (11) if there were no risks. In the deterministic case,
when one selects the controls (c,f) we know for certain that net worth X and consumption
cX grow at rate M(f,c). There are also stochastic components to the change in net worth.
We must also consider the risk terms R(f,c) = (1/2) var [dXt/Xt], which is one half of the
variance of the growth in net worth. Risk contains the control debt ratio f, variances and
co-variances. Hence the DP equation (14) can be interpreted as (17). Maximize the sum
of the utility of current consumption plus V* = M-V expected utility: a linear
combination of a mean M and (1-γ)R a risk R times positive risk aversion.
(17) δ/γ = max c,f {utility current consumption + [Mean - (risk aversion)(Risk)]}
Equation (17) shows that the maximization with respect to the optimal debt/net
worth from the DP equation can be given a M-V interpretation, since debt is only in the
V* term. A negative debt is a positive financial asset position.J.L. Stein 12
Figure 3. Mean-Variance Interpretation of the DP equation for optimal debt/net worth f*
in the Rational Expectations case, where µ = 0.
A graphic discussion of the determination of f* the optimum debt/net worth is described
in figure 3, for the Rational Expectations case where there is no expected speculative
capital gains. The DP equation requires that we select a debt/net worth ratio f that
maximizes the "mean-variance expected utility" V* = M(f,c) - (1-γ) R(f). The mean
M(f,c) is a linear function of f the debt/net worth. The slope of the Mean function dM/df
= (b - r) is the expected return less the expected interest rate. Intercept (b-c) is the
expected return less the consumption ratio. Variations in the consumption ratio only
affect the intercept and not the slope of the Mean function. Therefore optimal debt/net
worth is independent of the consumption ratio.
The uncertainty concerns the risk R(f), which is a quadratic function of the
debt/net worth, and is defined in equation (14c). In figure 3 quadratic risk function R(f)
reaches a minimum at  f = f(0), which is equation (15b) - the intercept term in the optimal
debt/equity equation (15). To minimize risk when f(0) < 0, the firm should be a creditor.
There is a big difference between the M-V interpretation of the DP equation and
the static two-period M-V analysis. For example, in the DP interpretation/ RE caseJ.L. Stein 13
denoted by asterisks, optimal debt Lt* = f*X* t. Net worth X*t varies according to
stochastic differential equation (11) when µ = 0. As X*t varies, the debt L*t must be
varied instantaneously to maintain the ratio f* to net worth X*t. On the other hand, in
static M-V analysis (Robison et al), a rise (decline) in net worth implies that, while
holding constant the level of risky assets, the debt should be decreased (increased). Thus
inter-temporal DP analysis can be given a M-V interpretation, but one cannot go from
static M-V to inter-temporal optimization.
5. Application to farm debt crisis
5.1. Accumulation of debt in the prosperous years
An application of the DP technique to explain the US farm debt crisis of the early
1980s (see FDIC, 1997) may serve as a model how to monitor the debt of any country or
region. The agricultural crisis has been selected because there are available data that
closely correspond to the theoretical variables.
Agriculture flourished in the 1970s. Farm exports grew rapidly and along with the
domestic inflation farm incomes reached all-time highs. These factors produced capital
gains on farm assets. Credit was readily available. Real interest rates (r - µ) were low and
farmers used the rising value of farm assets as collateral for loans. Farmers would
purchase farm real estate with moderate down payments and, after the value of the newly
purchased land increased, would use the increased equity to buy additional farm land
with minimal downpayments. Higher levels of real estate debt were supplemented by
debt to finance machinery and equipment. The speculation in land produced capital gains
µ > 0 and raised X the market value of equity. Figure 1 shows how the ratio of interest
payments/value added = INTVA = debt burden, grew as the farm EQUITY rose. By
1979, the debt burden was almost 3 standard deviations higher than it was in 1973.
Lenders were not concerned since equity rose by as much, due to the capital gains.
5.2 Crisis: collapse of the bubble
The bubble started to burst in 1979 and the depression continued through the
decade of the 1980s. In the fall of 1979, the Federal Reserve undertook a restrictive
monetary policy and interest rates rt rose drastically. The resulting appreciation of the USJ.L. Stein 14
dollar reduced foreign demand for US agricultural products. The decline in foreign
demand was exacerbated by the debt crisis in the less developed countries. Farm exports
declined by 40% from 1981 to 1986, at a time when productive capacity had increased.
The decline in demand is a decline in bt. Figure 1 shows how EQUITY fell from 1980-86
by about 3 standard deviations, and farm delinquency rates on commercial bank loans
rose drastically. We contrast the Rational Expectations case µ = 0 with the market bubble
µ > 0, and derive Warning Signals of an impending crisis.
Defaults will occur at time T when the economy cannot service the debts without
a decline in consumption, described by equation (25), based upon (2a) above even when
investment is zero. The key to the crisis or collapse of the bubble is that the interest
payments are growing rapidly, there is a negative shock to the return on capital bt, a
positive shock to the interest rate rt and there is a constraint on new bank lending dLt.
(25) CTdt = (bTKT - rTfs XT) - IT + dLT
As a result of the bubble µ > 0, the ratio of debt/net worth is fs, net worth is XT
and interest payments are rTLT = rT fsXT. The cash flow at crisis time T = 1980 is the first
term in parentheses: value added YT = bTKT less interest payments rTLT = rT fsXT. At time
T= 1980, there was a negative shock to the productivity of capital bT, and a positive
shock to the interest rate rT, which produced a severe decline in cash flow. Consumption
would fall unless the farmers obtain new loans dLT to service the debt. This Ponzi
scheme will not last for long for the following reason.
The expectation of the debt Lt = fsXt in the bubble case exceeds that in the
Rational Expectations case (denoted by asterisks), since fs > f* and X > X*. When µ > 0,
the  expectation of the debt that would exist at time T is E(LT) =  fs E[XT] = fs X0 exp [((b
- c) + (b - r)f + (1+f)µ) T]. The expected net worth is derived from stochastic differential
equation (11) using the proof in Øksendal, pp. 60-61.
The lending constraint is assumed to be satisfied in the RE case, equation (15c).
However, when the bubble µ > 0 is significantly high, such that ((b - c) + (b - r)fs +
(1+fs)µ)  > η, the lending constraint will eventually be violated. The bubble case is the
left hand expression and the RE is the right hand expression.
(26) [E(LT) = fs E(XT)] > h R0e
ηT > [E(L*T) = f*E(X*T)]J.L. Stein 15
The banks/lenders are constrained to lend no more than multiple h of their reserves which
grow at rate η.As the speculative bubble continues, loans rise towards the maximum that
the banks are willing to finance. The availability of funds for new loans declines,
particularly when cash flows decline. Even though interest rates may not reflect it, banks
decrease the availability of credit. The decline in the availability of new loans dLT means
that the third term in (25) declines; and it may even turn negative. The decline in all three
terms in (25) implies that: To service the debt, consumption must decline. This will lead
to defaults and hence a debt crisis. This scenario also describes many of the major
international debt crises.
5.3 Warning Signals
Warning signals WS will be based upon the difference between the actual
debt/net worth and the sustainable RE optimal f*. Similarly, the WS will be the difference
between the interest payments/value added and the RE optimal based upon f*.
We base our estimates of the means b and r upon available information. The US
Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service (ERS), Agricultural Income and
Finance, Farm Income and Balance Sheet Indicators contains data for: Yt = value added,
Kt = value of farm assets = capital , Lt = debt, rtLt = interest expenses, and (Kt - Lt) =
equity = net worth, all measured in constant dollars on a base 1996=100. The sample
period is 1960-2002.
The interest rate on the debt  rt = INTDEB is a weighted average of the interest
rates rtLt/Lt . Five-year moving averages of gross real value added/real capital =
GVACAP = Yt/Kt and INTDEB from year T-5 to the present year T, are used to estimate
the means. The mean net return is a five year moving average of real gross value
added/real farm assets less interest rate, denoted by (b-r)5 , measured as percent per
annum. This variable is based upon available information. Both (b-r)5 and the variance of
the net return are slowly changing over time.
Ideally, we would like our warning signal WSt to be the difference between the
actual debt/net worth = Lt/Xt and the RE optimum f* in equation (15-RE).
(27) WSt = Lt/Xt - f*t = Lt/Xt - [m(b - r)5  - f(0)], where m = 1/(1−γ)σ
2 
As the difference increases, the debt burden rtLt/Yt rises  and the probability of a debtJ.L. Stein 16
crisis increases, see equation (26). The measure of risk aversion is arbitrary, and the
variance differs among sub-periods. Therefore, we use two warning signals, evaluated
when m = 1/(1−γ)σ
2 = 1, and f(0) = 0. In (28a), we measure the deviation of the actual
debt/equity ratio from the moving average of the net return. This is labeled WARNING.
(28a) WARNING = Lt/Xt  - (b-r)5
Warning signal WARNING2 in (28b) is the deviation of interest payments/value added
rtLt/Yt from the moving average of the net return.
 (28b) WARNING2 =  rtLt/Yt - (b-r)5 .
Both warning signals are graphed in figure 4, where the variables are normalized,
(variable - mean)/standard deviation. Each warning signal is measured in units of
standard deviations to facilitate a comparison and provide orders of magnitude. The
normalization is why the evaluation at m = 1 and f(0) = 0 is not a problem.
The farm debt crisis occurred during the period 1980-88, the shaded area, when
defaults and delinquency ratios rose drastically. On the basis of this figure we see the
usefulness of the warning signals WS. From 1965-75, there were no warning signals - the
"green light" was on. From 1973-77, the two WS rise by one standard deviation - the
"amber light" is on. By 1979, the WS has risen to two standard deviations from 1975: the
"red light" is on. In 1980, the crisis occurs.
From 1975-83 the 5-year moving average net return was declining, and from
1979-84 the actual net return was negative. The actual numbers are as follows.
debt/equity mean net return (b-r) interest expense/value added
1975 20% 4.55% 11.8%
1985 29.8 -1.87 22.48
The optimal debt/equity ratio and interest expense/value added should have been
declining rather than rising. Our analysis, based upon Dynamic programming, correctly
predicts a debt crisis in the shaded region and correctly predicts tranquil periods pre-1979
and post 1990.J.L. Stein 17
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Figure 4. WARNING = debt/equity - retvaintd5 = (L/X)t - (b - r)5  , WARNING2 =
interest payments/value added rtLt/Yt - (b - r)5 , DELINQRATECOM = delinquency rate
on commercial bank loans for agricultureJ.L. Stein 18
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